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Summary 
The implementation of eco-labelling schemes for agricultural and food products may 
represent an opportunity to enhance production technologies compatible with the 
sustainable economic approach. The paper presents an attempt to design a comprehensive 
methodological framework in which the consumer behaviour change is the driving force for 
redirecting the market, the production, and the international trade. This approach focuses on 
the specification of the most relevant variables necessary to implement a simplified, but 
comprehensive analysis, from which it is possible to proceeding to a broad estimate of the 
changes in terms of consumption patterns, revenue distribution, import and export, and 
natural resources consumption. 
On a theoretical basis, the framework highlights that the most relevant conservation effect 
on natural resources, occurs when the eco-labelling schemes are enforced by two countries, 
under a market regime of free trade. On the contrary, if only one country adopts the 
schemes, then the effect is negligible. 
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1. Introduction   
The setting and enforcement of policy measures aimed at natural resource conservation 
represent a controversial matter since, in the one hand, it is necessary in order to pursue a 
sustainable economic development by encouraging free trade and fair competition but, on 
the other hand, the lacking of environmental regulations may negatively affect the future 
availability of resources, with severe consequences on the wealth for future generations. 
Among the most common environmental policy measures, the concern of WTO member 
countries has been focused on the setting of environmental standards and the 
implementation of environmental certification schemes. Both of them may be used to serve 
for protectionist purposes, although the mechanisms by which they interfere with 
production, trade, and consumption are quite different. 
Since the 1990s environmental certification has been pointed out as an instrument to 
support sustainable production methods (Stevens et al., 1998). Eco-labels, in particular, 
have received great attention in the WTO (WTO, 1999): a voluntary eco-label scheme is 
present in almost all countries of the world except Australia, Africa and Brazil 
(Environmental Protection Agency, 1998). Most eco-labels schemes are promoted through 
a direct initiative of governmental bodies (e.g. the EU eco-label, the US EPA Energy Star) 
and often the schemes include environmental prescriptions related to environmentally-
friendly production methods.  
The use of these schemes for food products often implies the imposition of the 
environmental concerns of importing countries in matter of production methods, to their 
trading partners, with considerable effects on trade and welfare (Greaker, 2006). 
However, we claim that the most relevant issue is to demonstrate whether eco-labelling 
schemes are effective in order to achieve the preservation of natural resources. In this 
regard, the literature is still lacking of methodologies and models useful to evaluate the 
effectiveness of these sort of environmental certification on natural resources preservation,   508
in order to estimate who gets losses and benefit, within an international economic 
framework. 
The domain of environmental certification is wide, but in this paper we refer in particular to 
agricultural products, because of the growing world-wide consumer interest in 
“environment-friendly” food, drink, and natural fibre, and the role that eco-labels may play 
in rewarding good environmental performance for these production sectors. 
In this paper we propose a methodological framework for the investigation and the analysis 
of the effects of the environmental certification, developed within the neoclassical 
paradigm, in which we model the interaction of the changes in the demand (consumer 
demand theory), and the comparative advantage between two countries (Heckscher-Ohlin 
model). We investigate the effects of the certification under three different scenario: 
autarky, free trade with certification adopted by one country, and free trade with 
certification adopted by both countries. 
Our hypothesis is that the consumer concern in environmental protection represents the 
driving force to increase the market share of certified goods, and also causing the 
emergence of a premium price, in contrast with the standard goods.  
The structure of the paper is described as follow. In the next section we briefly describe the 
background and the state of the art related to the environmental certification and eco-
labelling. In the third section, we describe the methodological framework for developing an 
economic model. We follow the neoclassical theory, in order to model the direct and 
indirect effects of the certification to consumers, natural resources stock, and income 
distribution. The last section concludes the paper. 
2.  Background of Eco-Labelling schemes 
An eco-label is a tag placed on a product that certifies that it is produced through an 
environmentally-friendly process. Such tags let consumers make informed choices about 
what they are buying, so that, if a consumer is concerned with the environment, he can 
support responsible food production. In essence, eco-label is a device conceived to enhance 
the market efficiency, aimed at solving the problem of asymmetric information, in order to 
differentiate a good with different level of environmental quality, for which consumers are 
willing to pay a premium price. A few years ago, the EU has enacted a specific regulation 
on this matter (Reg.(EC) 880/92), that has been revised more recently with Reg.(EC) 
1980/2000, clearly states which products are eligible for the eco-label award scheme, and 
the basic rules. At the present, the regulation excludes food, drink, pharmaceutical and 
some categories of medical devices. 
However, there are some example of eco-label schemes applied to fishery products, where 
the adoption of traditional catching techniques are dangerous for some species (e.g. 
dolphins are accidentally killed during the tuna fish catching). Recently, the EU has 
launched the debate in this regards1. 
Another example is provided by the forest certification, where companies are requested to 
demonstrate their sense of responsibility, for adopting good management practices. Third 
parties certification bodies are providing labels to forest products derived from well-
managed forests (Toshiaki et al., 2006). The area of certified forests worldwide amounts to 
241 million ha, equivalent to 6.2% of the world’s forests (Kraxner and Rametsteiner, 2005). 
The reason for which eco-labelling represents a controversial issue during the negotiation 
process within the WTO partners relies on the fact that importing countries enforcing 
mandatory eco-labelling schemes, may insist that foreign exporters meet the same labelling 
                                                           
1 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the 
European Economic and Social Committee, launching a debate on a Community approach 
towards eco-labelling schemes for fisheries products, (COM(05) 275), on July 2005.   509
requirements, and therefore it might be used as a sort of technical trade barrier (OECD 
2003; WTO, 2002). 
In fact, the WTO states the principle that similar products are treated equally, irrespective 
of the country of origin, while the concept of eco-labelling is to differentiate the good made 
by an environmentally friendly technology, having higher quality for which consumers 
concerned with the environment are willing to pay a premium price. 
On the contrary, several members of the Doha Ministerial Conference agreed on voluntary, 
participatory, market-based and transparent environmental labelling schemes, as efficient 
economic instruments to allow consumers to discriminate environmentally friendly 
products from other products (WTO, 2003). 
The most important issue from an economic perspective relies on the fact whether eco-
labelling schemes are effective in the preservation of the environment, or not. In fact, the 
literature referring to this matter is relatively scarce. In particular, we found the study of 
Melser and Robertson (Melser and Robertson, 2005), in which analyze the environmental 
effects of eco-labelling by focusing on the externality problem coexistent with the 
production process of a good. Another study on the effects and relevance of eco-label 
schemes on the consumer choice has been carried out by Grolleau and Caswell (Grolleau 
and Caswell, 2005). In their analysis, they focus on the importance of the product labelling, 
as a mean to convey to consumers the additional quality embedded in a green good, and 
from which they expect to get an additional utility. 
However, in both cases, the analysis is mainly focused on the consumption side, while there 
is no particular emphasis on the effects on the trade flow of goods among international 
partners. 
On the contrary in the study of Greaker (Greaker, 2006) eco-labels are analyzed, in 
comparison with environmental standard, in a partial trade model with one domestic firm 
and one foreign firm. His results suggest that “…may be optimal for the domestic 
government to introduce an eco-label and get both firms to adopt the label, instead of 
setting an environmental standard”.  
3. Methodological  framework 
The approach we challenge in this paper is based on the assumption that eco-labelling 
schemes are able to increase the awareness and the responsibility of consumer 
consumption, such that they are able to affect producer choice. It is a typical marketing 
oriented perspective, where the firm strategy depends on the revealed preferences, tastes, 
and needs of the consumers. 
3.1. Effects of the certification on the demand 
Under the classical assumption of consumer theory, the set of affordable alternatives is just 
the set of the bundles that satisfy the consumer’s budget constraint. Considering the 
possible consumption bundles or consumption set, in which x1 is the quantity of a 
conventional food product and x2 is the quantity of all other  goods he wants to consume, if 
we know  the price of goods (p1, p2) and the fixed budget available to a consumer m, the 
problem  of preference maximization can be expressed as: 
) , ( 2 1
, 2 1
x x U Max
x x  
subject to: 
m x p x p = + 2 2 1 1  
This constrained maximization problem can be solved using the Lagrangian: 
) ( ) , ( 2 2 1 1 2 1 m x p x p x x U L − + − = λ  
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier.   510
Differentiating the Lagrangian with respect to x1, x2 and λ, putting the first order 















Therefore, the maximization implies that the marginal utility of the two goods is equal to 
the economic rate of substitution between them. This means that the consumer wants to 
find the point on his budget line that achieves highest utility, and satisfy the tangency 
condition that the slope of the indifference curve equals the slope of the budget line. 
If these conditions are satisfied we find the utility-maximization point and have the optimal 
choice of two goods (x1*, x2*) that satisfied the budget constraint. 
Suppose a country wish to introduce an environmental certification on food product to 
obtain a reduction of use of natural resource. The certification have a direct impact on x1,  
in that we can distinguish a market shared between the certificated product  αx1, and the 
non certificated product (1-α)x1, where α is the market share. 
The certification cause a variation of p1 and, after the certification on good x1, the 
consumer’s budget constraint becomes: 
m x p p x t p x = + − + + 2 2 1 1 1 1 ) 1 ( ) ( α α  
So, the problem of preference maximization became:  
) , ( 2 1
, 2 1
x x U Max
x x  
subject to: 
m x p p x t p x = + − + + 2 2 1 1 1 1 ) 1 ( ) ( α α  
In this new condition the optimal choice of two goods is (x1**, x2**), and the level of 
utility that consumers can achieve will depend on value of α and t, where t represents the 
increase of price derived from certification and α the penetration of certificated goods in 
the country and reflects consumer heterogeneity (Greaker, 2006). If consumers give more 
importance to personal taste rather than to environmental quality of production,  the 
demand function  is horizontally dominated,  if environmental quality of production  is 
more important than personal taste the demand function  is vertically dominated (Neven 
and Thisse, 1990).  
Another important aspect to analyze is consumers’ perception of quality: the information 
for intrinsic attributes may be search (if the consumer can learn about the quality level prior 
to purchase), experience (after purchase) or credence (not at all). The adoption of  an 
environmental certification can change a credence characteristic into a search characteristic 
and can reduce the asymmetric information between producers and consumers (Caswell et 
al., 2002). So certification became an external intervention to allow consumers to choose 
products that correspond to their preference and honest producers to signal their products. 
So the consumers’ utility from consuming an eco-labelled product is determined by its 
environmental characteristics and t represents his willingness to pay a price premium for an 
eco-label-ed good.  
3.2. Effects of the certification on the supply 
We suppose a supply function for each good based on a classic Cobb-Douglas production 
function, considering two basic factors: a bundle of generic production factors (F), and 
natural resources (E). 
According to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, we assume that both countries adopt the same 
technology, but they differ in terms of resources’ endowment: 
Therefore, the supply for any good in each country is given by: 
e f E F a S =
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In the case of environmental certification, we suppose a change in the production 
technology, such that the productivity of environmental resources increases, despite of the 
productivity of the generic production factor: 




x x x E F a S 1 1 1 1'  
If we assume that the environmental certification is not compulsory, we suppose that some 
firms will differentiate their products, in order to respond to consumer’s preferences. 
Therefore, in our simplified market model, we will consider three goods:  
- the standard x1, with supply function 
1 1 1 1 x x x x E F a S =  
- the ecolabelled x1, and the other good (x2), with supply function  
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The overall supply for the good x1 is provided by a mix of the standard and eco-label 
goods, such that:  
' ) 1 ( 1 1 1 x x x S S S α α − + =  
where α is the share of the market hold by the eco-labelled good. 
 
We need also to consider that production process involves also the remuneration of 
production factors, supposing the existence of an efficient market, either for the generic 
production factor, and for natural resources. We also consider that these remunerations 
correspond to the budget available for consumption, that is:  
vE rF m + =  , 
with r and v representing, respectively, the price for the purchase of the generic production 
factor and the natural resource. 
 
The introduction of an environmental certification, causing a change of a certain 
technology, toward another more respectful of the environment, at least for one good, will 
cause some effects in terms of a) consumption and production patterns (the ratio between 
x1 and x2), b) the budget available for consumption, and c) the distribution of income. 
3.3. Situation with autarky 
In the case of autarchy, the consumption of each good (D) cannot by higher than the 
domestic supply (S) and, therefore, at the equilibrium, there will be the case such that:  
D = S 
The effect of the enforcement of the certification on the demand of two ordinary goods, is 
similar to that of introducing a tax t on the good x1, causing a reduction of the quantity of 
good x1, and also the reduction of the quantity of good x2.  
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Figure 1 – Effect of price increase in the demand of an ordinary good 
 
The ratio between x1 and x2 changes according to the elasticity of consumption in respect to 
the consumer revenue (εR). If εRx1 > εRx2, then consumption of x1 will be reduced more than 
the reduction of x2, therefore the ratio x1 /x2 will decrease
2. On the contrary, if εRx1 < εRx2, 
then the demand of x1 will lower to a less extent than x2, causing the increase of the ratio x1 
/x2.  
 
In regards to the effects on revenue distribution and on the indirect demand of inputs, we 
consider the effects caused on x1 and x2. In the case of x2, since the price is unchanged, but 
the quantity decreases, producers always will lose, therefore there will be a reduction of 
income, more relevant for owner of the generic production factor, relatively to owner of 
natural resources. Moreover, there is a more evident reduction in the use of the generic 
factor, relatively to natural resources. 
On the contrary, when we analyze the effects on x1, we need to consider the elasticity in 
respect to its own price (εpx1). If εpx1 > 1, then the effect of the price increase consequent to 
the certification is offset by the loss for lower consumption. Consequently, producers will 
lose and, relatively, owner of the natural resources will lose more than the owner of F. In 
contrast, if εpx1 < 1, then producers of x1 will get a higher revenue and, relatively, the 
remuneration of natural resources, in respect of the remuneration for F. There will be a 
lower pressure on the natural resource, due to the change of a more green technology. 
3.4. Situation with free trade 
The first difference relies in the fact that consumption of each good (D) may differ from the 
domestic supply (S), due to import and export flows of goods. Consequently, we define two 
equations, corresponding to each country: 
D = S + Imp - Exp 
According to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, one country exports the good in which it has a 
comparative advantage, since it uses the factor that is relatively more abundant. On the 
contrary, the same country is better off from importing the good which uses the factor that 
is relatively more scarce (Basevi et al, 2001; Krugman and Obstfeld, 2003). In our case, we 
suppose that the Home is more endowed in F, in respect of E, while the Foreign is more 
endowed in E, in respect of F: 
                                                           











This implies that the Home imports food (x1) from the Foreign, which requires relatively 
more natural resources, while it exports the other good (x2), which uses more of F. 
Similarly, the Heckscher-Ohlin model states that trade causes a change in the relative prices 


























As follows, we discuss about the consequences of the environmental certification on both 
countries, either in the case only one country, or both countries may adopt the certification. 
The analysis is referred to the effect on the equilibrium. 
 
Case a1) Certification adopted only by the Home 
The adoption of a more green technology implies an increase of production costs for x1 
that, if compensated adequately by the premium price (t), may still represent an opportunity 
for product diversification, allowing the firm to be more competitive in respect to other 
firms. Therefore, to a certain extent, the market in the Home is characterized by two 
differentiated goods x1, of which the certified good is produced domestically, and 
exchanged in the domestic market, at price px1+t, while the ordinary good is either 
produced domestically, or imported, at price px1.  
If we assume that the supply of certified good is sufficient to satisfy the domestic 
consumption, and the premium price is sufficient to cover the additional costs for 
certification, the mechanism may work as a policy measure for protect from the foreign 
competitors. 
The overall effect might be a reduction of the import flow from the Foreign, despite the 
existence of the premium price, that may be perceived only by domestic producers. 
In this case, in the Home we may observe similar effects as in the case of autarky, while in 
the Foreign there should not be any relevant effect, as the relative prices between the two 
goods in the both countries remain basically unchanged, as well as import and export flows. 
 
Case b) Certification in both countries 
In this case, it is expected a more relevant effect, in that also producers in Foreign may 
pursue the achievement of the premium price t, under the condition that it is sufficient to 
offset the additional cost for the certification. Therefore, in this case, the relative price 
between the two goods increases in Home, determining an increase of trade from Foreign to 
Home. However, since the higher price corresponds to the certified product, this implies 
that in Foreign there is an increase of produce from the green technology. Natural resources 
will be preserved, but the overall production of the good x1 will be lower, in part due to the 
increased export to Home, and in part because of the technological change. Consequently, 
the price for good x1 may increase, to a certain extent, although consumer in Foreign may 
not be willing to pay for the certification. The price increase for the good x1 may cause a 
relevant reduction of the purchasing power of the other good (x2), with consequent 
reduction of imports from Home. In general, effects of the certification in Foreign are 
similar to the analysis in the case of autarchy, and even more amplified, since the good x1 
holds a relevant importance either in the demand and the production mix.  
4. Concluding  remarks 
The theoretical analysis has proved that the enforcement of voluntary, participatory, 
market-based environmental labelling schemes may be potentially efficient economic 
instruments in order to preserve natural resources. The effectiveness of this measure   514
depends on the market share of certified products, in comparison with other goods, the 
elasticity of demand to consumer revenue, and the market situation. In the case of free trade 
and under the hypothesis that certification scheme is implemented by only one country, the 
effects are limited to that country, similarly to the impacts in the case of autarky. However, 
most relevant impacts are expected when both countries agree to enforce voluntary 
certification schemes. 
The implementation of eco-labelling schemes represents a moderate approach, in contrast 
with other economic instruments. In this regard, they should be preferred, as they cause 
lower market distortion effects, while consumers concern towards environment may 
represent the real driving force for the pursuing of a more sustainable development. 
However, for the achievement of the preservation of natural resources, a combination of 
several policy measures may be preferred, in order to face to the complexity of this matter, 
such as: 
- economic measures, such as the introduction of environmental tax, to internalize the 
externalities originated as a co-product, or the payment of financial incentives, aimed at 
promoting cleaner production technologies; 
- regulatory measures, consisting in the enforcement of rigid environmental standards, 
indicating the minimum necessary requirements that producers have to comply, in order to 
enter the world market; 
- institutional mechanisms, based on the principle that polluters may establish contracts 
with those who detain the property rights of natural resources (approach based on the Coase 
theory). 
The integrated use of these policy measures should take into account of the type of the 
potential environmental damage, but also should consider that enforcing a too rigid 
environmental regulation may interfere with the market mechanism, causing market 
failures, and the emergence of economic inefficiencies. 
References 
Basevi G., Calzolari G., Ottaviano M. (2001): Economia Politica degli Scambi 
Internazionali. Carrocci Editore, Roma 
Caswell,J. A., Noelke C.M., and Mojduszka E. M. (2002): Unifying two frameworks for 
analyzing quality for food products. Global food trade and consumer demand for 
quality. Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publisher. NY 
Environmental Protection agency (1998): Environmental labelling - Issues, Policies, and 
Practice Worldwide, Washington, DC: U.S. EPA. 
Grolleau G., Caswell J.A. (2005): Interaction BetweenFood Attributes in Markets:The Case 
of Environmental Labeling. Working Paper no. 2005-5. University of Massachusetts 
Amherst, Dept. of Resource Economics 
Greaker M., (2006): Eco-labels, Trade and Protectionism, Environmental & Resource 
Economics 33: 1-37 
Kraxner F., Rametsteiner E. (2005): Western Europe certifies 50%, and North America 
30%, of their forests: certified forest products markets, 2004-2005. UNECE/FAO, 
Forest Products Annual Market Review 2004-2005, Timber Bulletin, vol.58 (3):8-
93. United Nations, Geneva 
Krugman P.R., Obstfeld M. (2003): International Economics, Theory and Policy. Pearson 
Education Inc., Boston 
Melser D., Robertson P.E. (2005): Eco-labelling and the Trade-Environment Debate. The 
World Economy, 28 (1): 49-62 
Neven D., Thisse J., F., (1990): On quality and variety competition. Economic Decision 
Making: Games, Econometric and Optimsation, Elsevier Scienze Publisher B. V. 
OECD (1997): Analysis of Non-tariff Measures, The case of Labelling: Overview and 
Analysis of WTO data. TD/TC/WP(203) 40, 13 November   515
Owari T., Juslin H., Rummukainen A., Yoshimura T. (2006): Strategies, functions and 
benefits of forest certification in wood products marketing: perspectives of Finnish 
suppliers. Forest Policy and Economics, 9: 380-391 
Stevens J., Ahmad M., Ruddell S., (2005): Forest products certification: a survey of 
manufactures. Forest Products Journal 48 (6): 43-49. 
Turner R. K., Pearce D. W., Bateman I., (1993): Environmental Economics. An elementary 
Introduction . Johns Hopkins University Press. Baltimore 
Varian H., (2003): Analisi Microeconomica. Cafoscarina 
WTO (1999): Trade and Environment, http://www.wto.org 
WTO (2002): Labelling for Environmental Purposes (Submission by Switzerland). 
Committee on Trade and the Environment. WT/CTE/W/219 
WTO (2003): Report to the 5th Session of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun. 
Committee on Trade and the Environment. WT/CTE/8 
Acknowledgements 
The authors are thankful for the useful advice and suggestions provided by Prof. Giacomo 
Zanni and Prof. Gianluca Nardone. 
Contact information (example) 
Maurizio Prosperi 
Dipartimento PrIME 
Universita' degli Studi di Foggia 
Via Napoli 25 
I-471100 Foggia (Italy) 
 
Phone: +39 – 0881-589.356 
Fax: +39 – 0881-589.349 
Email: m.prosperi@unifg.it 